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CITIZENS UNITED AND TIERED
PERSONHOOD
ATIBA R. ELLIS*

I. INTRODUCTION
Citizens United v. FEC' is, arguably, the most important
campaign finance judicial decision of this century thus far and will
likely be remembered as the most significant--and controversialdecision of the Roberts Court. At least one commentator has
claimed that Citizens United rearranged the political landscape of
the United States. 2 The decision has certainly been the subject of
much praise and even more criticism. The praise comes from
pundits and opinion makers that have claimed that Citizens
United finally made the law of politics more consistent with core
free speech principles.3 Critics of the opinion have ranged from
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. The
author wishes to thank Professor Steven Schwinn and the John Marshall Law
Review for their kind invitation to be part of this symposium and for their
engagement with these comments at the symposium and during the editing
and publication of this Article. The author would also like to thank andre
douglas pond cummings, Anne Lofaso, Jena Martin Amerson, Will Rhee,
Gregory Bowman, and Stefan Padfield, for fruitful conversations about and
feedback on this Article. The author would also like to thank Ulysses Jaen,
Access Services Librarian of the WVU College of Law George R. Farmer, Jr.
Law Library for invaluable assistance. The author also wishes to thank
Yasmina Ghantous, Dallas F. Kratzer III, Jenny Hayhurst, and Joseph Kinser
for their research assistance. Finally, the author would like to thank Dean
Joyce McConnell of the WVU College of Law and the College's Hodges Faculty
Research Fund for support of this Article. The author takes responsibility for
all views and errors in this Article.
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) [hereinafter Citizens
United].
2. See Robert Barnes, Citizens United Decision Reverberates in Courts
Across Country, WASH. POST, May 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/citizens-united-decision-reverberates-in-courts-across-country/2011/05/
20/AFbJEK9G.story.html (stating "[tihe Supreme Court's decision in Citizens
United ... rearranged the political landscape. And fallout from the decision
continues to reverberate in courts across the nation.").
3. See Greg Stohr, Corporate Campaign Spending Backed by U.S. High
Court, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news
?pid=newsarchive&sid=aU.fsorJbt3E (quoting Sen. Mitch McConnell of
Kentucky as saying that the Court "struck a blow for the First Amendment");
Stephen Dinan, Divided Court Strikes Down Campaign Money Restrictions,
WASH. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010, 11:19 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com
717
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President Barack Obama;4 Senator Russ Feingold, with whom
Senator John McCain disagreed;5 media analysts;6 election
activists;7 and the American public themselvess who have called
the opinion inconsistent with American democracy.9

/news/2010/jan/21/divided-court-strikes-down-campaign-money-restrict/?page=
2 (quoting Hans A. von Spakovsky, a former member of the FEC, as saying,
"[tihe Supreme Court has restored a part of the First Amendment that ha[s]
been unfortunately stolen by Congress and a previously wrongly-decided
ruling of the [Clourt.").
4. See Obama Criticizes Campaign Finance Ruling, CNN (Jan. 21, 2010,
1:52 PM), [hereinafter Obama Criticizes], http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com
(quoting
President
/2010/01/21/obama-criticizes-campaign-finance-ruling
Obama as saying that the Citizens United ruling "gives the special interests
and their lobbyists even more power in Washington. . . .").
5. See Kasie Hunt, John McCain, Russ Feingold Diverge on Court Ruling,
POLITICO.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:04 PM), http://www.politico.comi/news/stories
/0110/31810.html (quoting former-Senator Russ Feingold of Wisconsin as
saying that when "[p]resented with a relatively narrow legal issue, the
Supreme Court chose to roll back laws that have limited the role of corporate
money in federal elections since Teddy Roosevelt was president.").
6. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in
Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010
/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html (suggesting "[tihe Supreme Court has handed
lobbyists a new weapon. A lobbyist can now tell any elected official: if you vote
wrong, my company, labor union or interest group will spend unlimited sums
explicitly advertising against your re-election"). Indeed, at least one
commentator has suggested that the Citizens United decision is the worse
judicial decision since Dred Scott v. Sanford and would result in corporations
effectively owning the entire political system. Keith Obermann, Keith
Obermann on [sic] "Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission," YOU
TUBE (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-PKZKETizybw. But
see Nick Gillespie, 3 Reasons Not to Sweat the "Citizens United" SCOTUS
Ruling, YOU TUBE (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?vrUdFalYzNwU&feature=related (arguing that the liberalization of speech
done by Citizens United is a benefit).
7. See, e.g., Democracy 21 President Fred Wertheimer Calls for Prompt
Legislative Response to Citizens United Decision in Senate Rules Committee
Testimony, DEMOCRACY 21 (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.democracy21.org/
index.asp?Type=BPR&SEC=%7B91FCB39-CC82-4DDD-AE4E-3A81E6427C
7F%7D&DE=%7B6A1258A6-ABDB-433A-BO06-80052AO4CD54%7D
(advocating for stronger disclosure requirements for corporations and other
reforms in light of the Citizens United decisions).
8. A Washington Post-ABC News Poll conducted Feb. 4-8, 2010, revealed
the American public's dissatisfaction with the Citizens United decision. The
poll indicated that at that time, 80% of respondents opposed the ruling, and
that 72% of respondents supported Congressional action to reinstate the limits
struck down by the Court. See Washington Post-ABC News Poll, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll02101O.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (noting responses to questions 35 and 36 relating
to Citizens United ruling).
9. See, e.g., Obama Criticizes, supra note 4 (calling the Citizens United
ruling "a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance
companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every
day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.").
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The debate concerning the ramifications of Citizens United
has been equally robust. Scholars discussing Citizens United have
focused on its impact within a variety of contexts: how Citizens
United made First Amendment free speech doctrine more
consistent,' 0 whether and to what extent the case will impact
election spending," whether this case impacts the integrity of the
campaign finance system,12 and the consistency or inconsistency of
the idea of corporate personhood13 underlying the case.' 4
The debate that has occurred since Citizens United has failed
to pay full attention to the ramifications of the Court's analysis of
"personhood." This is not to say that the topic of "corporate
10. See Joel M. Gora, Commentary, N.Y. Times Editors, How Corporate
Money Will Reshape Politics: Restoring Free Speech in Elections [hereinafter
Corporate Money],
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
21,
2010,
2:10
PM),
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/how-corporate-money-willreshape-politics/ (Professor Joel M. Gora, in an opinion piece, wrote that "[t]he
First Amendment has always been based on the idea that the more speech we
have, the better off we are, as individuals and as a people. The Citizens United
[sic] case eloquently reaffirms and reinforces that core constitutional
principle."); cf. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 584 (2011) (asserting that Citizens United
makes the Court's corporate finance doctrine incoherent and inconsistent).
11. See Adam Liptak, O'ConnorMildly Criticizes Court's Campaign Finance
Decision, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/01/26/oconnor-mildly-criticizes-courts-campaign-fmancedecision/?hp (quoting former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's
opinion that "[iun invalidating some of the existing checks on campaign
spending, the majority in Citizens United has signaled that the problem of
campaign contributions in judicial elections might get considerably worse and
quite soon.").
12. See Fred Werthheimer, Commentary, How Corporate Money Will
Reshape Politics: An Electoral Catastrophe,N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:45
PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/how-corporate-money

-will-reshape-politics/ (writing that under the Citizens United decision
"insurance companies, banks, drug companies, energy companies and the like
will be free to each spend $5 million, $10 million or more of corporate funds to
elect or defeat a federal candidate - and with that power, influence the
candidate on issues of economic important to the companies.").
13. See generally DAVID H. GANS & DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER (CAC), A CAPITALIST JOKER: THE STRANGE ORIGINS,
DISTURBING PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD IN
AMERICAN LAw (2010), available at http://www.theusconstitution.org

/upload/fck/file/File storage/A%2OCapitalist%2OJoker(1).pdfphpMyAdmin-Tz
XZ9IzqiNgbGqj5tqLHO6F5Bxe (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning corporations being extended the same fundamental rights as
individuals). Mr. Gans was a contributing panelist during the symposium.
14. See, e.g., Matthew J. Allman, Note, Swift Boat Captains of Industry for
Truth: Citizens United and the Illogic of the Natural Person Theory of
CorporatePersonhood, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 388 (2011) (opining that the
Court's "reliance on the natural person theory is misplaced for three major
reasons: first, the theory is divorced form observable reality; second, the
theory is logically incoherent; and third, the theory is inconsistent with the
meaning and purpose of the Constitution.").
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personhood" has not been given attention in the scholarly
literature prior to Citizens United,15 that the way in which Citizens
United has defined corporate personhood has not been explored,' 6
or that there is not a substantial literature concerning personhood
as it pertains to natural persons.17 However, nowhere in this
growing literature has anyone called attention to the theoretical
intersection between the considerations of the larger literature of
personhood, the shift in the idea of personhood created by Citizens
United, and its ramifications for the jurisprudence on defining who
is a person for purposes of distributing constitutional rights. This
Article-which the reader should treat as the author's initial
thoughts about the theoretical consequences of this landmark
case, thoughts to be explored in greater depth in subsequent
articles-claims to present an initial effort to articulate this view.
Within the Citizens United context, the conventional starting
point is to discuss the issue of corporate personhood. Indeed, the
personhood issue seems to be a problem particular to the corporate
form of artificial persons, and this Article will limit its discussion
to corporations as artificial persons.' 8 As will be discussed below,
15. The debate concerning corporate personhood was a mainstay of the
academic literature prior to Citizens United. See generally Carl J. Mayer,
Personalzingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS
L. J. 577 (1990) (discussing various Supreme Court Cases that, over the past
few decades, have increased corporations' personal liberties); Susanna Kim

Ripken, Corporationsare People Too: A Multi-dimensional Approach to the
Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97 (2009)
(discussing several different theoretical schools of thought in considering the
question of a corporations' personhood).
16. See generally Alex Osterlind, Note, Giving a Voice to the Inanimate: The
Right of a Corporation to Political Free Speech, 76 MO. L. REV. 259 (2011)
(discussing corporate personhood in the manner it was considered by the
Supreme Court in Citizens United); Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How
the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations
Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523
(2010); Jan Baran, Citizens United v. FEC: Independent Advertising by
Corporations, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4875 (2010), available at
http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/Baran%20Lexis%20Nexis%20
Article.pdf; Allman, supra note 14, at 387-410.
17. For purposes of this Article, I will be distinguishing "natural persons,"
which are defined as "human beings" (i.e., animals of the species Homo
sapiens) from "artificial persons," which are defined as "an entity (such as a
corporation) that is recognized at law as having most of the rights and duties
of a human being. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
"person").
18. Unions and other non-corporation "associations of persons" are not
relevant here. This is for several reasons. First, to the author's knowledge,
none of the prior debates concerning artificial personhood have included
unions. Second, as my colleague, Dr. Anne Marie Lofaso, pointed out to me,
unions are distinguishable from corporations within this context because
unions are organized by their members for the purpose of benefiting their
membership. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (2006) (defining "labor organization" as
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the corporate person is traditionally conceived of as an artificial
entity that exists by sufferance of the state and thus may be
limited by the state.19 However, the Citizens United decision relied
not merely on the conventional view of corporate personhood; it
sought justification for its decision with the idea that a corporation
is an "association of persons." 20 At least part of the core
justification for the decision is the view that an association of
persons, whether a corporation or labor union or some other
"association," ought to be imbued with the same rights as the
rights the persons themselves possess. In other words, these
"associations" should be wholly equated to natural persons in
regards to constitutional rights.
This plausible reading 2' of Citizens United continues to blur
"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work."); see also Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union
Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 40 (2008) (defining "labor organization" as is
defined by the statute). In contrast, the predominant view of the purpose of
corporations is to generate profit for their shareholders. See, e.g., Jena Martin
Amerson, What's in a Name: Transnational Corporationsas Bystanders Under
International Law, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (2011) (finding that a
transnational corporations' actions are often fueled by self-interest). But see
Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the "Responsible"
Shareholder, 10 STAN J. L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 33 (2005) (noting this view but
arguing that the legal requirement for corporate directors maximize profits is
ambiguous). Thus, the political interests of individual union members may
directly affect the interests of the union, and the union may be held
accountable to such interests by its members, whereas a corporation's
directors or employees may undertake action that is disinterested in the
political interests of its shareholders, or even in opposition to the political
interests of its shareholders so long as it can be justified on the grounds of
maximizing profit. In such a scenario, accountability is virtually impossible to
achieve. Osterlind, supra note 16, at 281 (discussing the use of corporate funds
to advance political speech, the author finds that "[u]nauthorized corporate
political speech impinges upon the First Amendment liberty of such
unrepresented shareholders . . . . [B]y the time a shareholder first learns his

political views conflict with those disseminated by the corporation, the initial
harm has already been inflicted."). Third, non-corporate organizations whose
main function is to advocate for parties, candidates, or political positions
simply do not fit within this discussion as they have benefitted from this core
First Amendment protection, where the First Amendment rights of
corporations have been the subject of intense scrutiny by the courts for a
number of years. See infra Part III (discussing corporations in the context of
political personhood).
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906-08.
21. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 16, at 584 ("Cases such as Buckley, Bellotti,
and Citizens United, all of which unquestionably accept the 'corporations as
natural persons' mantra, have created a political atmosphere in which
corporations can wield their financial power while the interests of the people
has been relegated to the sidelines."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of
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the distinction between artificial persons and natural persons.
This blurring suggests that we ought not only look at Citizens
United as merely a case that resolves a conflict about the First
Amendment, or that pushes the boundaries of corporate
personhood; we should recognize that Citizens United forces us to
look at our assumptions about how legal personhood-for both
natural and artificial persons-is constructed in the law. This shift
raises the question of what the ramifications of our legal norms
are if we accept this assumption. This Article will consider this
question by viewing Citizens United through the lens of natural
personhood caseS 22 and through the application of a critical
jurisprudential perspective. 23
Freedom of Speech, 124 HARv. L. REV. 143, 154 (2010) ("But Justice Stevens
clarifies that his focus on corporate personhood is ultimately relevant less to a
theory of self-expression than to whether an entity possesses the preconditions
for raising an equality claim."); Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral
Spending, and the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 663, 673-74
(2011) ("[I]n Citizens United in particular, the Court has embraced the real
entity theory, which more strongly supports treating corporations as rights
holders equivalent to individuals."). For a discussion of the historical evolution
of the corporate form, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, To Be or Not to Be?
Citizens United and the Corporate Form (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 10-005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1546087.
22. This approach, examining a landmark case through the lens of other
landmark cases with an eye on a particular descriptive or normative question,
is nothing new. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens
of ConstitutionalHistory, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2001) (considering the
Bush case through the lens of other landmark Supreme Court decisions,
including Dred Scott v. Sandford, Brown v. Board of Education, Furman v.

Georgia, Roe v. Wade).
23. Specifically, this Article suggests that the jurisprudential ramifications
of Citizens United should be viewed through the lenses of Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) and, more specifically, Critical Race Theory (CRT) and Feminist
Legal Theory. "[CLS] is a theory that challenges and overturns accepted
norms and standards in legal theory and practice. Proponents of this theory
believe that logic and structure attributed to the law grow out of the power
relationships of the society. The law exists to support the interests of the party
or class that forms it and is merely a collection of beliefs and prejudices that
legitimize the injustices of society. The wealthy and the powerful use the law
as an instrument for oppression in order to maintain their place in hierarchy.
The basic idea of CLS is that the law is politics and it is not neutral or value
free." See Critical Legal Studies: An Overview, LII/LEGAL INFORMATION
INSTITUTE, http://topics.law.cornell.edulwex/Criticallegal-theory (last visited
Sept. 12, 2011). CRT is a specific offshoot of CLS which sought to develop
methodologies to examine and confront entrenched racism in American
society. See andre douglas pond cummings, A Furious Kinship: CriticalRace
Theory and the Hip-Hop Nation, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 499, 501-03 (2010)
(discussing the emergence of CRT). Feminist Legal Theory is a jurisprudential
school designed to look at the role of gender and the law. It takes as its
guiding assumption the idea that society is patriarchal and that the law has
been used to re-enforce such patriarchy. LII/LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
supra at 4. Indeed, feminist legal theory examines explicitly how women
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The question of who was-and who was not-a legal person
framed American society from its founding to today.24 Although
the three-fifths compromise of the 1787 Constitution,25 and the
Founders' and states' legal treatment of race shaped the fact that
African Americans were treated as chattel or as noncitizens, 26 the
have been excluded from "the public sphere of marketplace and government"
and relegated to the private sphere of home. Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Women's Subordinationand the Role of Law, reprinted in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 9-10 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993), available at
http:/books.google.com/books?id=55TYVDVVBiIC&q=the+public+sphere+of+t
he+marketplace#v-snippet&q=%22the%20public%20sphere%200f%22&f=
false. This Article does not purport to articulate an overarching theory that
looks at the intersections of these issues; it does, however, seek to enlighten
the reader about the larger theoretical ramifications of the Citizens United
decision through voicing an analysis informed by a narrative critical view of
American society based in the legal history-and modern experience-of
women and people of color. For assistance in realizing these connections and
for larger insights into the larger normative enterprise of law, I must credit
my colleague, Will Rhee, and his forthcoming article Law and Practice:
Balanced Realism and the Epistemology of Legal Doctrine, 9 J. LEGAL COMM.
& RHETORIC (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript on file with the author).
24. As noted earlier, this debate takes place most often within the realm of
questions of citizenship. For an overview of the long history of the granting
subordinate status, i.e., status of less than full citizenship to women,
minorities, indigenous peoples, and immigrants, see generally EDIBERTO
ROMAN, CITIZENSHIP AND ITS EXLCUSIONS: A CLASSICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL,
AND CRITICAL RACE CRITIQUE 83-118 (2010). Professor RomAn correctly
includes indigenous peoples and immigrants within the scope of his discussion
of citizenship; for want of space do I not include them in this Article. For an
overview of citizenship policy pertaining to non-United States citizens who
seek to enter into the United States, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between
Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy, in FROM MIGRANTS TO
CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD (Aleinikoff and Douglas
Klusmeyer, eds. 2000).
25. The "three-fifths compromise" was the political and economic agreement
reached by the founders during the Constitutional Convention, which allowed
representation within the House of Representatives to be based upon the
whole number of free persons and three-fifths of the number of persons held in
servitude, i.e., slaves. This was an attempt to reach a compromise between the
northern and southern states to agree to adequate representation in the
government. However, this was also part of a larger scheme "to sublimate the
rights of blacks to the interests of whites." DEREK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND
AMERICAN LAW 28 (6th ed. 2008). More to the point, it is a rhetorical
illustration of one of the premises of this Article-that enslaved African
Americans were less than full persons in the eyes of the white establishment.
For further discussion of slavery and the founding fathers, see id. at 25-28.
For a narrative of the politics that led to the compromise, and specifically the
politics of slavery, see LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, DARK BARGAIN: SLAVERY,
PROFITS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 123-29 (2005).
26. Though articulated in terms of citizenship, or political personhood, as I
suggest in this Article in light of the Citizens United transformation, the
underlying framework for these debates is the question of race and racism.
The deliberate formation, creation, and perpetuation of a racial hierarchy has
been the ongoing theme of American history, from the first settlement of
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Court's jurisprudence had a direct hand in shaping this notion of
personhood. The Court, in cases like Dred Scott v. Sanford27 and
Plessy v. Ferguson,28 drew-and then redrew-the boundaries of
political personhood in relation to race in our society. Similarly, in
Minor v. Happersett29 the Court confirmed the boundaries of
political personhood in regards to gender. These cases served to
grant rights as well as legal and social privilege to certain persons
in our society, usually at the expense of others. Similarly, during
the early nineteenth century, the law and society maintained the
notion that women had no social standing and thus were less than
citizens. This also framed societal conceptions of personhood.
As will be explained in this Article, this way of thinking about
legal personhood created what Professor Henry Chambers called
(in the context of Dred Scott) "tiered personhood." 30 The legal
history discussed below illustrates the point that this process of
granting personhood categorizes and makes separate levels of
legal personhood by excluding some, giving others some rights,
and giving the most privileged full rights-or full political
personhood. Additionally, the forms of wealth and power that
those privileged persons received through their status and which
they used to re-enforce their status were also given prominence.31
The question of personhood was (and is) imbedded in a
related question, "who is a citizen?" As the post-Civil War
amendments and their application sought to delete the distinction
between legal persons and nonpersons-and as this shift towards
equality was resisted at every turn-the citizenship question took
prominence.
Though conceptually distinct, the citizenship question
revolves around the same issue as the question of personhood:
Europeans in America to modern-day concerns about criminal justice, the
rights of aliens, social and economic disparities. Discrimination on the basis of
race has been an organizing tool of American society, and in the United States,
discrimination on the basis of race has been expressed state policy. JUAN F.
PEREA ET AL, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 6 (2d ed. 2007).
27. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
28. Plessy v. Ferguison, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
29. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
30. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Dred Scott: Tiered Citizenship and Tiered
Personhood, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 210 (2007) (arguing that tiers of
personhood and of citizenship are created when certain citizenship rights are
stripped from a person or a group of people without proper justification).
31. In other words, I argue in this Article that a choice about personhood
forms a hierarchy not only of status within society, but it also provides a
means to accumulate capital and re-enforce one's status through the capital
one accumulates. I argue below that this mechanism-fundamental to a
capitalist structure-and the personhood issues I raise are intertwined. In
relation to corporations and the political process, Citizens United puts this
issue in clear relief, as will be explained below.

2011]

Tiered Personhood

725

What entities are entitled to the range of constitutional rights as
distinct from other entities? Cases like Brown v. Board of
Education32 and Roe v. Wade,33 as well as passage of the
Nineteenth Amendment, 34 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 and the
Voting Rights Act of 196536 ultimately expanded the boundaries of
personhood to include people formerly excluded or subordinated by
American society. Put another way, these cases were efforts to
erase the tiers of personhood. As a whole, these personhood
decisions confirmed or removed privilege and reset the political
boundaries that restricted access to American democracy for their
era.3 7
This Article argues that Citizens United is the latest in this
line of cases because it set wide open the category of personhood
from simply natural persons-that is, human beings-to
corporations, unions, and other legal entities. Put another way,
Citizens United forces us to once again ask, "what is a person?"
The Court has expanded the boundaries of what I am calling
"political personhood." I define political personhood as both a
status and a framework. As a status, political personhood allows a
natural person to exercise the range of constitutional rights and
entitles a person to receive constitutional protections. The political
personhood process is where the Court-as well as lawmakers,
enforcers, and society generally-establishes a norm of who is
recognized as a person for purposes of the legal privilege. In
addition to being a grant of rights, political personhood provides
privilege and status, allowing it to amass and affect capital in a
manner that best enables and enforces the privilege of those who
possess political personhood. In this way, granting political
personhood reinforces status and separates some with greater

32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
35. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964),
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The Civil Rights Act provided statutory
protections to prevent discrimination against minorities and women in public
accommodations, employment, governmental services, or employment.
36. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)
amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The Voting Rights Act prohibits discriminatory
practices in voting, elections, and other relevant mechanisms of the
democratic process.
37. Yet we are still trying to answer the citizenship question. As I contend
in this Article, the modern citizenship question includes the issues raised by
Citizens United of the role of corporations in our modern democratic process,
and the role of people-acting as individuals-in that process. I will suggest
the possibility of what I discuss in the last part of this Article. It is worth
noting, however, that the battles over citizenship are ongoing. For example,
Professor RomAn describes how structures of de facto subordination have
evolved into modern-day de facto subordination for African Americans,
Mexican Americans, and other non-whites. RomAn, supra note 24, at 119-46.

726

The John Marshall Law Review

[44:717

status and power from others. The process creates tiers of
personhood.38
Now, after Citizens United, political personhood includes not
only natural persons but also artificial persons-whose sole
purpose is to amass capital and generate profit-to participate in
political discourse. And arguably, the artificial person of the
corporation may become more significant, and may have the power
to exercise rights to a greater extent and on a greater tier, than
the natural person.
This Article makes an initial effort to support the argument
that the Court is engaged in an ongoing process of defining
political personhood and Citizens United is the latest opinion to
this end. Towards this goal, this Article will proceed in four parts.
First, it will define political personhood as a process of shaping the
boundaries of democratic discourse and then briefly sketch its
operation through an exploration of the personhood cases
described above. Second, this Article will briefly sketch out what
scholars have said about corporate personhood and corporate
constitutional rights with the goal of showing how these rights
were thought of as limited and distinct from the rights granted
natural persons.
Third, this Article will illustrate how the breadth and scope of
the reasoning of Citizens United suggest that it more appropriately
fits within the political personhood line of cases. This Article will
argue that this expansion of the idea of personhood represents a
fundamental shift in the idea of political personhood, yet at the
same time represents the underlying operation of the political
personhood idea as expressed during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Finally, this Article will conclude by offering thoughts
on the effects of Citizen United if it is interpreted from this
perspective. As I discuss below, the main effect of the new
conception of personhood in Citizens United will be twofold: First,
it will allow for corporate interests to obtain an unprecedented
level of dominance over the American political discourse. Second,
this corporate dominance will reaffirm an old form of supremacy:
the power of the mostly white and mostly male class that controls
corporations. This new era of corporate rights dominating the
rights of natural persons may lead to a new period of tiered legal
personhood in our democracy, an outcome that is inconsistent with
the vision of rights under our modern Constitution.

38. Rubin, supra note 16, at 584; Chambers, Jr., supra note 30, at 231-32.
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POLITICAL PERSONHOOD

A. Personhood and the Allocation of Rights
As defined earlier, political personhood is a status that allows
a person to exercise the range of constitutional rights connected to
persons, and it entitles a person to receive the constitutional
protections that accompany those rights. A grant of this status is
not inherent or automatic; it is socially contingent and a process of
choice that is inherent in the law. This subsection will discuss why
this is the case and then elaborate more fully on the nature of
political personhood as related to natural persons.
This discussion starts with a basic proposition: that law
works by creating categories and then allocating authorization to
act or penalties for acts based on whether the entity in question,
and its actions, fit the constructed category.39 This methodology of
categorization is intrinsic in legal reasoning in a western common
law system. It is axiomatic that law creates categories and
allocates privilege or sanction through approving categories and
disapproving others, and then locating entities either within or
outside of those categories. 40
When it comes to applying the law, a court, lawmaker or
decision maker-either explicitly or implicitly-must answer
several questions regarding categorization: Is the category itself
consistent with the intent determined by the politically
responsible body or by social convention? Is the entity capable of
being categorized appropriately? Even if the category is sound and
the entity is susceptible to categorization, the decision maker must
face the question of whether the entity in question fits within the
legal category presented. This dynamic seems basic to the process
of adjudication even if the answers to these foundational questions
are taken for granted in the vast majority of cases.
From this basic premise we can recognize that the law must
categorize entities to allocate rights. This process is often taken for
granted when it comes to natural persons. We can ascertain what
a natural person is; there is an easily applied scientific definition
for what a person is, and it is easier still to distinguish persons
from artificial entities and natural nonpersons. As a result, the
question of what is a person is often taken for granted. Similarly,
when it comes to legally created entities like corporations and
labor unions, entities that we treat like persons for discrete
purposes, e.g., contract formation, litigation, and other ends of

39. See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARVARD L.

REV. 1047, 1058-60 (describing the aesthetic of law as one of classification of
categories and policing those categories).
40. Id.
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business,41 it is easy to identify them as artificial persons since
they must act through their legal authorization and construction.42
The question of what is a corporation, thus, is similarly taken for
granted in most cases.
It follows that as between persons, rights must be allocated
based upon the politically sanctioned categories put in place
within the law. 43 This is true for entities subject to the law,
whether they are natural persons or artificial persons. For
example, persons who are citizens are allocated the maximum
amount of rights allowed under American law. Persons who are
not citizens cannot receive rights reserved for citizens. This is
often premised in the American context on a theory of a social
contract. 44 This methodology of categorization of persons is
essential to both an understanding of relating rights to persons
and to comparing valid and invalid exercises of those rights as
part of ordering the constitutional scheme.
This methodology of categorization also reveals something
else intrinsic to the process of allocating rights: there may be
rights intrinsically associated to the nature of the person.
Pointedly, there are rights that only have meaning in relation to
the person exercising those rights because the right was created
41. Ripken, supra note 15, at 106.
42. See id. (acknowledging the argument that "[t]he corporation is simply a
creature of statute and is dependent on the law to give it form and function").
43. Mayer, supra note 15, at 623 (discussing the Court's decision in Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) and noting that "[t]he individual exists antecedent
to the state and therefore owes no duty to the state and cannot be deprived of
any constitutional rights. The corporation, however, is a mere 'creature of the
State.' Its powers are limited by law ....").
44. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law,
51 FLA. L. REV. 3 (1999) ("According to some historians, the American
colonists relied upon liberal, Lockean notions of a social contract to spirit
rebellion against unwanted British rule. Historians have maintained that
social contractarian theories of political order significantly influenced the
people who wrote and defended the Declaration of Independence, the original
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights."); JOHN WITHERSPOON, Lectures on Moral
Philosophy, in AN ANNOTATED EDITION OF LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOSOPHY
BY JOHN WITHERSPOON 45 (Jack Scott ed., 1982) ("The central tenet of
Witherspoon's political philosophy in common with those of other American
revolutionists was the theory of the social contract."); Christine N. Cimini, The
New Contract: Welfare Reform, Devolution, and Due Process, 61 MD. L. REV.
246, 275 (2002) ("[The Declaration of Independence, original state
constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and the federal Constitution with
its accompanying Bill of Rights all based their notions of the structure of
democratic government on ideas of social contract. These documents amount
to a formalization of the social contract between the government and its
people."); see also Janice Aitken, The Trust Doctrine in FederalIndian Law: A
Look at its Development and at How Its Analysis Under Social Contract Theory
Might Expand Its Scope, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 115, 147 (1997) ("Social
contracts may be formalized, as in a constitution, or they may be the 'legal
fictions' that legitimize governmental authority.").
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for the person-whether natural or artificial-for a purpose
related to that person's status. 45 Conversely, it may be argued that
entities of a particular sort, i.e., natural persons, by their status as
natural persons have certain inherent rights.46 For example, in the
context of the earlier consideration of citizenship, it is clear that
the idea of citizenship is premised on the notion that citizens are
persons, and that it is the "person" who is entitled rights within
our society. One might argue that citizenship belongs to persons
and not to nonpersons; 47 however, without regard to whether a
person is a citizen or not, that person may nonetheless have
certain rights guaranteed to her by simple virtue of being a person.
Thus, there are, arguably, some rights to be exercised by
persons-or, at least, rights conceived of and intended to protect
natural persons, and other rights that are not so conceived. Put
another way, there are rights that are intrinsic aspects of legal
personhood.
Thus, at the heart of the categorization question is the
question of how to define a person in order to allocate rights to
those persons for whom there is an intrinsic fit with the rights.
And, therefore, for the purposes of the allocation of constitutional
rights, the notion of personhood plays a fundamental role. For the
purpose of allocating legal rights, and for being an object of legal
responsibilities, the idea of personhood must be defined. The next
subsection of this Article will discuss natural persons; a brief view
of the forest of paper expended on corporate personhood will follow
in Part III.
B. What Is A Person,Anyway?
This is a deceptively simple question. A brief look at Black's
Law Dictionary reveals this deceptively simply conclusion: a
person is "a human being."48 Beneath this simple answer is a far
45. See, e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Dignity of the Human Person and
the Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries, 14 J. L. & RELIGION 53, 60-61
(noting that in the American context, the idea of rights became to be known as
the possession of free standing individuals); see generally MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991) (discussing the nature of rights discourse in
American society).
46. See generally Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and
American Constitutions, 102 YALE L. J. 907 (1993) (summarizing the role of
natural rights in the constitution and arguing that such rights were in fact
limited).
47. See generally Linda Bosniak Persons and Citizens in Constitutional
Thought, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 9 (2010) (discussing the alignment-or nonalignment with the concept of person and the concept of citizen in
constitutional law).
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (Bryan Gardner ed., 9th ed. 2009).
Blacks also notes in definition (3) that a person is also "[a]n entity (such as a
corporation) that is recognized by law as having most of the rights and duties
of a human being." Id. This will be discussed more thoroughly in Part III.
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more complex history relating to how political personhood-in the
sense of having the full range of rights and privileges-in the
United States was only bestowed upon white men who owned
property-until societal, judicial, and statutory change modified
this definition of personhood.
Within American constitutional history, personhood has been
equated, in the natural person context at least, being a full human
being with the ability to exercise rights. Not all human beings met
this definition during the entirety of our constitutional history.
Until the Thirteenth Amendment, slaves were not considered
persons; they were considered property. Married women were
considered the property of their husbands,49 and prior to marriage,
the property of their families.50 Though chattel slavery and the
supremacy of husbands over wives reflected different lived social
and societal realities, they both shared the fact that neither a
slave nor a married woman in the nineteenth century could
exercise the basic rights that white men could: to vote, to own
property, to travel freely, to enter into and terminate contracts,
and to completely own their bodies.
It follows that the role of personhood is to grant rights
reserved ordinarily for, and specifically to, Homo sapiens citizens.
The delineation of those rights and the allocation of those rights to
those humans the Republic deemed worthy of holding such rights
defines legal personhood. It determines who composes our
Republic and what democratic assumptions control within our
republic. The Court, through some of the most infamous and
celebrated cases in American history, executed precisely this
analysis. 5 1 It determined what persons ought to be entitled rights
or excluded persons from the status of having rights. Put another
way, the Court determined who would and would not hold political
personhood. Then the Court, through its judgment, sought to
include or exclude the subject person (or class of persons) in
question by analogizing that person to the norm of entities who
held political personhood.
This definition of personhood is best explored through an
investigation of the history of adjudicating personhood. The next
section will argue that there is a specific process of categorization
49. See TIFFANY K. WAYNE, WOMEN'S ROLES IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 17 (2007) (stating "[t]he American colonies had followed British
common law of feme-covert, or coverture, which determined that women were
legally 'covered' by their husbands through marriage.... Upon marriage all
property, land, even personal possessions and wages earned, became the
property of her husband, as did her children.").
50. No SMALL COURAGE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 261
(Nancy F. Cott ed. 2000) ("In practice, coming of legal age mainly freed young
women from parental authority. . . .").
51. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393, Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537, Minor, 88 U.S. at
162.
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that the Court undertakes to reach the conclusion that a person
exists for the purpose of legal rights. This Article will then turn in
the next part to comparing briefly this process with the theories of
corporate personhood.
C. The Processof PoliticalPersonhood

Natural personhood constitutional cases all share the
following aspects. First, the Court makes a specific choice to
analyze the issue as one of political personhood; this inquiry is
essential to the legal decision. Second, after the choice is made to
make a political personhood determination, the Court has to
reason as to whether the purported person fits the definition of
"person" and thus falls within the category of citizen. This requires
a definition-either implicit or explicit-of what a person is. Once
this decision is made, the Court can then declare whether their
person-or nonperson-fits the category in question.
1.

Framing

The issue of how to frame the question is as important as
the ultimate result itself. Framing considers the decision that the
Court faced in defining what the precise legal question is. In
particular, in many of the constitutional personhood cases, the
Court faced a decision about whether or not to treat the case as a
constitutional rights case of some sort or to frame the issue as one
of statutory or common law. For example, Dred Scott could have
been decided on standing grounds 52 rather than reaching the
broad constitutional issue it decided-that slaveholders had a
Fifth Amendment property right to their slaves (as property),
which is protected against government regulation53 and taking,
and that people of African descent had no citizenship rights that
the United States was obligated to recognize. Similarly, Brown,
which outlawed discrimination, could have been decided on
narrower grounds-not the least of which would be stare decisisin deference to Plessy v. Ferguson, which itself regulated the
personhood of African Americans by giving them so-called
"separate but equal" rights to participate in the Republic. 54

52. See

MARK

A.

GRABER,

DRED

SCOTT

AND

THE

PROBLEM

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 19 (2006) (noting comments from both the other
Justices and political leaders that the decision could have been simply
dismissed on standing grounds).
53. For a thoughtful discussion of Dred Scott's holding and its impact on
constitutional theory generally, see Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, 13
Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49 (2007).
54. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51 ("[W]e cannot say that a law which
authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public
conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth
Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored
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Though not determinative, the framing question illustrates
the proposition that the judges often choose specific issues-and
though
the
in particular-even
questions
personhood
constitutional personhood question may not be presented directly.
By defining a question to be an absolute issue about rights, as
opposed to a question that is about the issue presented, the Court
has often overreached to create doctrine that may or may not have
been necessary at the time. This process seems to demonstrate the
importance of framing a constitutional issue-and therefore raises
the constitutional personhood question-rather than resolving the
legal issue through a rule with lesser impact. It suggests that the
Court in these "personhood" cases chose to draw the line where it
is, and draw conclusions of law that it was not necessarily
obligated to decide.
2. Categorization
Once a constitutional question has been discovered, the core
determination that the Court made in this history of personhood
cases is whether the entity seeking rights is a person for purposes
of the Constitution. It is this determining of personhood, or
categorization, related to who is and who is not a person that is at
the heart of the personhood analysis. And this analysis of "what is
a person" revolves around the status of the "entity" at question in
relation to the acceptable norm or idea of what a "person" is. Put
another way, to answer a constitutional personhood question, the
Court must engage in a process of determining the form of the
entity seeking rights, and then decide whether that entity fits
within or outside of the accepted or privileged norm for "persons."
It is not a question of biology-it is a question of on whom (or
what) the Court wishes to confer status and why.
The story of African American personhood cases illustrates
this. In Dred Scott, Plessy, and Brown specifically, what is clear is
that each one of those opinions operated on the basis of a norm of
personhood. More specifically, each of those opinions contemplated
a hierarchy of persons within society. Dred Scott excluded slaves
altogether from the definition of persons who were entitled rights
with its language that no slave had rights which a white man was
obligated to recognize.55 Thus, as property, slaves had no status
whatsoever. Slaves were not persons. African Americans were
chattel, and the Dred Scott Court even went so far as to say that
persons of African descent could never be citizens.5 6 The Plessy
children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not
seem

to have been

questioned,

or

the corresponding

acts of state

legislatures.").
55. Chambers, Jr., supra note 30, at 211.
56. Id. at 213 ("Basing his analysis of black citizenship at the Founding on
race and ancestry rather than status, Taney merged race and slavery,
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Court was confronted with the constitutional norm of equality
imbedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.57 However, the Plessy
Court determined to treat African Americans as equal on a
"separate but equal" basis.58 The Plessy majority recognized that
African Americans were citizens,5 9 but did not recognize that
citizenship rights had to be distributed to persons on a fully equal
basis. 60 In its place, Plessy created another tiered scheme of
citizens and not-quite-citizens: "Separate but Equal."6 ' Brown
rejected this hierarchy in its rhetoric and its holding.6 2
These cases illustrate the categorization of political
personhood. In other words, as scholars in this field have often
pointed out, each opinion worked from the assumption of privilege
of white persons and then accorded African Americans those
privileges relative to that norm of whiteness. This illustrates the
operation of the process of defining personhood, in how African
Americans were excluded entirely from personhood in Dred Scott,
granted limited personhood through partial recognition of
citizenship rights in Plessy, and then ultimately granted full
personhood by the Court in Brown. In each instance, the Court: (1)
found a constitutional question related to the extent of rights due
under the Constitution to African Americans; and then (2)
allocated rights in proportion to the acceptable norm of
personhood.
This status as personhood question is similarly illustrated by
the plight of non-slave women in American society during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The question of full political
personhood for women did not even exist until a movement to
mobilize for women's rights began in the mid-1800s.6 3 Prior to that

asserting that all black persons had come to America as slaves. Consequently,
all black people, whether free or slave, were descendants of slaves and were in
the same class of people, for citizenship purposes, as slaves, and thus were
unable to be or become citizens of the United States.").
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
58. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548-49 ("While we think the enforced separation of
the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the State, neither abridges
the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property
without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws,
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment...").
59. Id. at 550-51.
60. Id. at 543.
61. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that the law in question in
Plessy purported to create a "separate but equal" status between African
Americans and whites).
62. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (holding that segregation in schools is
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment).
63. See COTT, supra note 50, at 242-51 (describing the historical evolution
of the women's rights movement).
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point, the law considered a woman as a form of property. 64 For
example, a married woman was effectively the property of her
husband. This meant that a married woman could not own
property in her own name, enter into contracts, or otherwise
exercise the basic private law rights that a man had.65 A married
woman had little to no recourse for exiting abusive relationships. 66
Women did not have the right to engage in professions (except for
homemaker and perhaps teacher).67 If personhood is seen as
possessing full status and complete privilege within society,
women lacked personhood during the pre-Civil War period of
American history.
This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that women lacked
,core political rights: they could not vote, engage in discourse about
civil society, or otherwise participate in political decisions. Indeed,
the Court reinforced this vision of women as non-persons within
the sphere of politics through its decision in Minor v. Happersett.
Although the Court recognized that women were citizens6 8 and
persons69 for purposes of the Constitution, it nonetheless declared
that the Constitution did not add the right to vote to the privileges

64. WAYNE, supra note 49, at 17.
65. "[A] married woman could not engage in or bring forth lawsuits; she
could not enter into business contracts, nor could she buy or sell or otherwise
have control over any property, even that which she may have brought to the
marriage." Id. at 17. For an explanation of property rights as they applied, or
more appropriately did not apply to women, see LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 147-48 (3d ed. 2005).
66. "As late as 1850 wife beating with a 'reasonable instrument' was legal
in nearly every state... ." KENNETH D. ROSE, AMERICAN WOMEN AND THE
REPEAL OF PROHIBITION 12 (1996). For a discussion of women's marital rights,
see FRIEDMAN, supra note 65, at 140-45. In many cases, divorces would only
be granted for "good cause" or because adultery had been committed. Id. at
142-44. As Friedman explains, "[i]n general, the law never recognized full, free
consensual divorce." Id. at 145.
67. In 1860, the most popular women's magazine of the era, Godey's Lady's
Book, proclaimed: "The perfection of womanhood ... is the wife and mother,
the center of the family. . . . The wife is truly the light of the home." WAYNE,
supra note 49, at 1. As Tamara K. Hareven explains, "[o]ne of [the]
consequences [of the 'cult of domesticity' that emerged in the nineteenth
century] was the insistence that confinement of women's main activities to the
domestic sphere and the misguided assumption that mothers' work in the
labor market would be harmful to the family and to society." Tamara K.
Hareven, Continuity and Change in American Family Life, in MAKING
AMERICA: THE SOCIETY AND CULTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 308, 316 (Luther
S. Luedke, ed., 1992). In fact, Edward H. Clarke of the Harvard Medical School
Faculty believed that "too much education" would be so strenuous to a
woman's physical strength, that it would actually endanger her childbearing
ability. DOROTHY M. STETSON & DOROTHY E. McBRIDE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN
THE USA: POLICY DEBATES AND GENDER ROLES 150 (3d ed. 2004).
68. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165 (1874).
69. Id.
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and immunities of citizens. 70 Thus, the Court reasoned that the
right to vote was not guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and therefore, the Missouri law that reserved the franchise to men
was upheld. 7' Thus, in a different personhood context, the Court
made a similar decision to limit the scope of privileges and
immunities so that women were excluded from the political
sphere.
The political personhood of women certainly was recognized,
slowly, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Interestingly, this movement began through the efforts of liberal
white women to recognize the civil and human rights of enslaved
Africans in America. 72 This work of organization and resistance
led to mobilization towards the recognition of women's rights. This
led to the movement to pass the Married Women's Property ActS73
and the Nineteenth Amendment. 74 This empowerment led to
further reforms, including the ultimate recognition that the right
to privacy included the ability for women to exercise complete
control over their bodies without state interference.75 This
recognition is the core intellectual contribution of Roe v. Wade.76
70. Id. at 171.
71. Id. at 173-78.
72. See WAYNE, supra note 49, at 106 (remarking, "[w]hether white or
black, women's involvement in the antislavery movement transformed
women's own sense of themselves and of their public roles. Through their work
in the antislavery movement, women learned how to be political activists, how
to organize, and how to pursue new strategies beyond just 'moral suasion,'
such as gathering petitions, lobbying legislatures, writing for and editing
newspapers, organizing conventions, and delivering public speeches."). As Bob
Ostertag explains, "[tjhe roots of the women's rights movement in the United
States [were] deeply intertwined with abolitionism." BOB OSTERTAG, PEOPLE'S
MOVEMENTS, PEOPLE'S PRESS: THE JOURNALISM OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENTS 52 (2006).
73. WAYNE, supra note 49, at 18 ("When an organized women's rights
movement emerged in the late 1840s, the issue of married women's property
rights was one of the main ones targeted for reform. In 1848 New York State
passed the landmark Married Women's Property Act, which became the model
for other states throughout the remainder of the century.").
74. ELIZABETH FROST-KNAPPMAN & KATHRYN CULLEN-DUPONT, WOMEN'S
SUFFRAGE IN AMERICA 21 (2005) ("The women's rights movement had its roots
in the campaign to end slavery. . . . '[Ifn the age which is approaching she
should be something more-she should be a citizen."').
75. See generally DEBRAN ROWLAND, THE BOUNDARIES OF HER BODY: THE
TROUBLING HISTORY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2004) (discussing the
effects of legislation on women's rights to control their bodies).
76. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. In holding that the right of privacy extended to the
ability of women to choose medical procedures in regards to their unborn,
nonviable fetus, the Court ultimately vindicated the ability of women to own
their own bodies which, in light of the discussion above concerning personhood
and the sanction by the state of control of bodies, is the ultimate overthrow of
the intellectual roots of nineteenth century tiered personhood as to natural
persons. This concept merits far more discussion, but such discussion must be
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What was true of these personhood cases concerning African
Americans is that the Court privileged the dominant form of social
male
white
history:
American
during
construction
supremacy.7 7 Moreover, the system of wealth that existed as a
consequence of (and served to re-enforce) white male supremacy,
i.e., the financial benefits that accrued from having a mater and
subservient class, was "dismantled," at least in the eyes of the
Court, in Brown.78 Similarly, the economic status and societal
benefits that came from excluding women from the political sphere
and relegating them to the domestic sphere demonstrated how
political personhood was not given to women. It too created a
79
master class (men) and a subservient class (women).
These allocations of privilege based on race and gender
illustrate the truth of those periods and the truth of our capitalist
society even now-that the definitions of personhood and property
not only define privilege but they also grant access to the most
effective means of influence and power. It creates a tiered society
where those who possess political personhood in full are allowed to
dominate contests between those who have full personhood and
those who do not; it also allows those who possess political
personhood to amass capital and wealth to re-enforce and replicate
their own status.
III.

CORPORATIONS: THE SPECIAL CASE OF POLITICAL
PERSONHOOD

The process of determining political personhood relates to the
rights to be granted to natural persons as part of the polity of the
United States. With the rise of the corporate form in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Court had to confront the
question of what rights corporations should be granted within the
constitutional scheme. This issue of corporate personhood became
a vexing intellectual and legal dilemma. Citizens United puts it
reserved for another day.
77. See Chambers, supra note 30, at 214 (stating that "Taney noted that
Southern states never would have ratified the Constitution had they believed
that black persons could be citizens whose rights of citizenship would have to
be protected as they travelled from state to state.").
78. Dismantling took a decade of effort, however, due to the mass resistance
of the South to the Brown decision. The Court had to revisit the issue in
Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), where the court ordered
transformation of the segregated schools of the South with "all deliberate
speed." Id. at 301. This set forth a long period of resistance to the order by the
white Southern society. This was only resolved by legislative change through
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and (sometimes)
vigilant federal enforcement.
79. Chambers, supra note 30, at 215 ("the [Dred Scott] Court noted that
women are citizens, but defined citizenship rights and responsibilities in ways
that allowed the possibility of second-tier citizenship for women.").
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squarely in relief once again.
The theoretical approach of this Article does not start with
the ongoing debate about corporate personhood.80 It focuses
instead on the transformation in the idea of political personhood
that the Court has adopted in the past and is now revising via
Citizens United.8 However, to effectively complete this
commentary about Citizens United, it is necessary to make some
observations about the corporate personhood dilemma. The Court's
own decisions prior to Citizens United and the literature
concerning corporate personhood suggest that though corporations
have been granted certain legal rights depending on how the
nature of the corporation was viewed, corporate artificial
personhood nonetheless is wholly different than the personhood
conceived of for natural persons.
Demonstrating this difference requires a brief discussion of
the predominant models of corporate personhood. Thereafter, this
next section observes how, pre-Citizens United, an artificial person
model of corporate personhood was applied to the question of
whether corporations were entitled First Amendment speech
rights, and how this set up the problem in Citizens United.
Additionally, the section will discuss the problematic compromise
created by Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.82 Then, Part
IV will address how Citizens United shifted the paradigm of
personhood to place corporations within the realm of objects of
political personhood.
A. PoliticalPersonhoodand the Theory of the Corporation
The personhood of corporations has been a longstanding topic
of debate in both judicial and academic circles. Arguments about
corporate personhood have generally revolved around three
different theories of corporate personhood.
The earliest theory of the corporation is that it is merely a
creation of the state.8 3 This "artificial person" or "concession"
theory rested on the view that a corporation effectively exists at
the sufferance of the state and, therefore, is not entitled to any
rights or protections not granted to it by statute. 84 Importantly,
80. I will not take an extended period of time to discuss the problem of
corporations and personhood as this topic will be treated in depth both in the
other volumes in the symposium and in the substantial scholarly literature on
this point.
81. See infra discussion Part III, IV.
82. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
83. Mayer, supra note 15, at 580 (discussing the Court's notions of
corporate personhood, the author explains that "[t]he first and most
traditional notion was the 'artificial entity' theory viewing the corporation as
nothing more than an artificial creature of the state .... ).
84. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)
(finding that "[a] corporation is an artificial being" created by the law and, as
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the corporation, as a creation of the state, could not assert rights
against its benefactor, the state itself.8 5
During the early part of the nineteenth century, political
leaders and the courts took this view of the corporation.
Corporations depended on legislative approval for their creationi.e., corporations were a concession provided by the governmentand were thus dependent on the legislature for their existence,
regulation, and the scope of their powers.8 6 Underlying this theory
is the idea that corporations were publically oriented.8 7 The
corporation was created for a public purpose and thus the state
could regulate its operations for the good of the public.88
However, this view shifted with County of Santa Clara v.
Southern Pacific Rail Co. 89 from one of mere artificial personhood

to a view that corporations held the status of personhood for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 90 In Santa Clara, the
Court held that a corporation is a person for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and accordingly, it cannot be taxed
differently than natural persons.9 ' Within this model, it was
argued that a corporation is an amalgamation of the people who
stood behind the corporation. 92 Thus, according to the
amalgamation model, it was appropriate to grant the corporation
rights in order to protect the rights of the people behind it.93
This model was in ascendancy during the Lochner era of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 94 Lochner jurisprudence allowed
corporations to receive the benefits of the deregulation that took
place during that period of the Court's jurisprudence.95 Indeed,
this view is premised on the view that the corporation is not a
creation of the state but the product of the free market and of
economic forces, and exists for the benefit of the persons who
constitute it. 96 Accordingly, the state should support the rights of
the persons who constitute corporations and not interfere with
their consensual actions.97
Indeed, at the turn of the twentieth century, a third model
such, "it possesses only those properties which
confers upon it. . . .").

the charter of its creation

85. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill
ofRights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 580 (1990).
86. Ripken, supra note 15, at 109.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
90. Rubin, supra note 16, at 554.
91. Ripken, supra note 15, at 110.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 111.
94. Id. at 579-80.
95. Id. at 580.
96. Ripken, supra note 15, at 111.
97. Id.
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emerged among scholars and the Court for how to conceptualize
the corporation: the "natural person" or "real entity" model.9 8 This
model rests on the premise that the corporation is an entity that
emerged separate and apart from the sanction or authorization of
the state.9 9 Also, it exists separate and apart from the natural
persons who might at any particular time control it.100 In this

sense, a corporation is a person-an entity with status and rights
that should be recognized under the constitution and laws.
The important implication of this real entity theory is that
the corporation has a life completely separate and apart from the
state; the state merely records the combination of the private
parties and plays only observer of the corporation's formation. 0 1
Accordingly, the corporation has a "collective consciousness" or a
"collective will" that is separate and apart from those who may run
the corporation at any given time.10 2 Thus, under this view, a
corporation may be considered to be fully a "person" under the law
and entitled to the legal rights and responsibilities that would
attend to any natural person. 0 3 A slightly different understanding
of the natural person view of corporations is the view that there
should be a public law of corporations, which seeks to regulate
corporations to ensure that they use their powers not merely to
generate profit for their shareholders, but that they benefit those
affected by the corporation and advance the public good. 0 4
What this theoretical debate about how to conceptualize the
corporation indicates is that there is a range of positions about
whether corporations should or should not be granted political
personhood. The concession model would suggest that there is no
such thing as political personhood for corporations. As entities
regulated and controlled by the state, statute defines the
corporation's legal boundaries. Thus, a corporation would not be
entitled any constitutional rights that would trump statutory
control.
The aggregation or amalgamation model suggests that the
corporation would be entitled a type of political personhood to the
extent that its incorporators would be entitled political personhood
status. Political personhood status for the corporation would
derive from the personhood of the people who compose it, which
would leave room to distinguish between the persons who organize
the corporation and the corporation itself. Similarly, the real
entity model suggests that the corporation is a political person
98. Mayer, supra note 94, at 580-81.
99. Ripken, supra note 15, at 112-13.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 112.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
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entitled all of the protections within the Constitution. The
distinction between it and the aggregation model is that the
corporation is entitled political personhood as a right intrinsic to
the corporation itself.
This brief discussion also suggests that it is plausible to read
the conception of personhood in Citizens United as adopting a
position relating to political personhood-the kind of personhood
this article previously suggested was ordinarily applicable to
human beings solely. This represents a substantial shift from the
jurisprudence of the Court concerning the ability of corporations to
spend in elections, where the Court upheld limits consistent with
placing the interests of citizens ahead of those of corporations. To
this prior jurisprudence this Article will now turn.
B. Political Speech and Corporations:The Bellotti
and Austin Thicket
The jurisprudence of the Court within the realm of corporate
political speech prior to Citizens United struck an uneasy balance
between what appears to be an aggregation approach to the
corporation and the desire to prevent the appearance of corruption
within the political process. The Court recognized that
corporations may have had First Amendment free speech rights
when it came to ballot initiatives about which a corporation might
wish to speak, but until Citizens United, a corporation's speech
rights-i.e., its own direct spending on elections-were curtailed
as to campaigns to elect political officials. These regulations had
been upheld 0 5-until Citizens United. This suggests that the
Court thought of corporations as political persons of a sort as they
pertained to the First Amendment, but only to the extent that
their interests did not interfere with the interests of citizens in
their democracy. To explain this proposition, this part will briefly
discuss the Court's campaign finance corporate spending
jurisprudence.
The seminal case which defines modern campaign finance law
is the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo.106 There, the Court struck
down a number of spending limits under the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974. Buckley, however, did not
address legislatively-imposed spending limits imposed on
corporations and labor unions. In the period between Buckley and
Citizens United, the Court at times possessed skepticism about
such limits and at times deferred to legislative judgments that
105. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581, 585-86 (2011) (noting that this has been the case since
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1976), wherein the Court held that
"campaign contributions could be limited to prevent corruption or the
appearance of corruption. . . .").
106. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28-29.
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such limits were necessary. 107 Under this jurisprudence, the
political personhood of the corporation was limited at best. The
Court recognized that a corporation could exercise free speech
rights, but the Court limited this right in recognition of the fact
that the corporation's ability to amass wealth made it
fundamentally different than the natural (political) person. Its
influence could corrupt the political process.
The first case to effectively recognize the political personhood
of corporations-at least as it relates to First Amendment free
speech-was the 1978 case of First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti.s08 There, the Court ruled that corporations had a First
Amendment right to make contributions in order to attempt to
influence political processes.10 9 The corporation in question sought
to spend money to influence a ballot initiative; however, the
Massachusetts law prohibited corporations from making
expenditures that would affect elections. 110
The Bellotti court reasoned that a speaker could not be
prohibited from political speech simply because the speaker was a
corporation.111 In particular, the Court rejected as an
impermissible constraint on First Amendment rights the notion
that its speech interests were restricted to topics that "materially
impact[ed]" the corporation's business interests. 112 This reasoning
suggests the Court had in mind the notion that a corporation
possessed political personhood-that it represented an entity
entitled to absolute protection due to its status as an entity
entitled to rights of speech.
Yet, this recognition was tempered by the Court in 1982 when

it recognized, in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee,113 that

the government had a compelling interest in limiting corporate

spending to prevent corruption. National Right to Work Committee
raised the constitutionality of section 441(b) of the Federal
Election Campaign Act114 which limited corporate direct spending
in campaigns. The Court upheld Section 441(b) as narrowly

tailored to meet the government's interests in insuring that
"substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special
advantages which go with the corporate form of organization
should not be converted into political 'war chests' which could be
used to incur political debts from legislators who were aided by the
107. DANIEL LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD HASEN, AND DANIEL TOKAJI, ELECTION

LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 807 (4th ed 2008).
108. First Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
109. Id. at 784-86.
110. Id. at 769.
111. Id. at 777.
112. Id. at 740.
113. FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
114. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b),
invalidatedby Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
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contributions."115 The Court also reasoned that Congress had
incentive "to protect the individuals who have paid money into a
corporation or union for purposes other than the support of
candidates from having that money used to support political
candidates to who they may be opposed." 16
Subsequently, in 1990, the Court heard Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,117 where it reaffirmed this limitation on
corporate rights of political speech. The Court ruled that a state
statute that prohibited corporations from spending money to
support or oppose candidates in elections was constitutional."18
There, the corporation in question litigated against the
constitutionality of the Michigan statute that prohibited
corporations from spending on behalf of candidates in elections.
The Austin court continued to afford corporations First
Amendment protection as to speech, but it found that this
particular campaign spending restriction passed constitutional
muster. The Austin court again recognized that the state had an
interest in preventing the corrosive influences that the massive
wealth which could be infused into an election by corporate
spending would have to distort an election.119 This view, often
called the "antidistortion rationale" of Austin, swayed the Court to
uphold the limits on campaign spending by corporations.120 The
Austin majority worried that direct corporate spending in elections
would have the effect of distorting the messages in the elections
due to the impact that massive amounts of spending by
corporations could have.121
The Court also noted that the restriction was narrowly
tailored to the state's interest in preventing corruption because
"the Act does not impose an absolute ban on all forms of corporate
political spending but permits corporations to make independent
political expenditures through separate segregated funds."122 The
Court noted that contributors who know the funds will be used for
political speech can pay into the segregated fund so that the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. at 207.
Id. at 208.
Austin, 494 U.S. 652.
Id. at 668-69.
Id. at 669.

120. The Austin court defined the anti-distortion rationale as the
government's interest stopping the "corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the
corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas." Austin, 459 U.S. at 659-60. For an
exploration of the treatment of the anti-distortion rationale in Citizens United,

see Richard Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion
Rationale, 27 GA. ST. L. REV 989 (2011).
121. Austin, 494 U.S. at 659.

122. Id. at 665.

Tiered Personhood

2011]

743

speech would accurately "reflect[] contributors' support for the
corporation's political views."123 In other words, the Austin Court
suggested that the interests in political speech-and the spending
therefrom-were the province of natural persons-actual citizens
who had the greatest stake in the electoral process. Speech via the
corporate form (through, e.g., political action committee funds)
that accommodated their views and still allowed their
contributions to enable the corporate person to speak was
acceptable.
Arguably, then, Austin balanced the risks of absolute
corporate political free speech created by Bellotti if Bellotti were
taken to its extreme: the balance sought to enable actual persons
acting through the corporate form to have political free speech
through that form. Though Austin was roundly criticized for
creating this carve out in the ideal of the First Amendment, it did
distinguish between the interest of natural persons and the
interest of corporate persons. That uneasy balance continued until
the Court handed down Citizens United.

IV.

THE CATEGORICAL CHANGE WROUGHT BY CITIZENS UNITED

Seen from the lens of political personhood, Citizens United
can be reasoned in this way: the Citizens United majority made a
judgment as to what rights corporations are entitled to and then
granted those rights. Arguably, the Citizens United Court could
have shown judicial restraint by just invalidating the portions of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that were directly at issue. 124
However, the Court pushed forward to find a broad constitutional
right of corporate political freedom of speech.
In its analysis, the Citizens United majority recognized that
for purposes of the First Amendment, corporations were
persons entitled to unlimited speech rights.125 The Court, through
Chief Justice Roberts, arrived there by determining that
corporations were merely associations of persons, citizens who
then take the corporate form in order to act.126 As an "association
of persons" the Court argued that a corporation-like any
organization of people-should be entitled to rights of speech.
In this we see the political personhood process at work. The
majority decided to first find a constitutional issue relating to free
speech (when it had the option to decide the case on far narrower
grounds). Second, the Court categorized corporations as persons by
making a decision as to whether corporations fit into the notion of
a political person, and then once a corporation was deemed to be
123. Id. at 660-61.

124. Hasen, supra note 106, at 593.
125. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914.
126. Id. at 906-07.
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sufficiently like a political person, the Court decided to imbue it
with rights. Thus, both of the "process" criteria of political
personhood have been met.
Indeed, it is clear from this that the Court adopted the
amalgamation model of the corporation as its way of categorizing
the corporation. The judgment of the majority was that the
corporation merely was a proxy for the persons behind it and thus
held political personhood to function for them. Accordingly, it was
entitled the full panoply of First Amendment rights in relation to
spending in elections. This sweeping theoretical choice locates the
Court as viewing the corporation as possessing political
personhood without limits.
As such an entity, the substantive concerns raised by the idea
of political personhood come into play. Granting this privilege of
absolute First Amendment freedom of speech creates a right that
the holders of the right-the corporations themselves-may use to
inculcate and replicate their privilege. As we saw with the
slaveholders in Dred Scott, the white male political establishment
in Minor, and the apartheid white society in Plessy, the Court's
ruling has the effect of providing a means for corporations-who
are organized by, controlled by, and provide profits to a privileged
group of mostly straight, white men-to ensure their dominance
over society through insuring their privilege through the political
process. Just like Dred Scott made slavery constitutional and
Plessy made segregation legally acceptable, the potential now
exists for corporations to distort the political process for their own
ends and dominate politics through unlimited spending. By
allowing corporations an unfettered voice in the political
marketplace, they have the potential through their amassed
capital to dominate ordinary citizens. By their sheer power, and
their ability to replicate and enforce that power, corporations can,
arguably, operate on a different tier of political personhood than
ordinary citizens and political parties.
This engagement of the political process to an end separate
and apart from natural persons drove the concerns of the Citizens
United dissent. Where the majority thought of the corporation as
an association of persons-qualifying as close to being a political
person-Justice Stevens in dissent saw corporations as statecreated entities that "differ from natural persons in fundamental
ways" 127; "have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts,
no desires" 1 28; and "must engage the political process in
instrumental terms if they are to maximize shareholder value."129
Of particular note, the dissent asserted, "corporations have been

127. Id. at 971 n.72.
128. Id. at 972.
129. Id. at 965.
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'effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society's economic
welfare."'13 0 This differs markedly from the idea of political
personhood espoused by the majority. Indeed, the majority clearly
relies on shoehorning corporations into traditional bounds of
personhood, an association of persons entitled to rights based on
their natural status. However, the Stevens dissent points out the
conflicting view, that corporations are better thought of as lacking
the attributes of persons and thus may be limited as legal-but
not real-person-like-entities.
As Justice Stevens observed, "corporations," those state
sanctioned entities now granted political personhood, "have been
'effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring society's economic
welfare."'131 This observation that the corporation is the dominant
form of capital in our modern society points us back to our
recognition of the effects of political personhood, that these choices
made by the Court are instrumental in the sense that they
privilege some class, group, or new entity (a group that, as I will
discuss shortly, is almost entirely white, straight, and male). Now,
for First Amendment purposes, political persons-whether real
persons or state-created entities-may participate in the political
process. A class of entities is now privileged, so the question
becomes: "At whose expense does this privilege come?"
V.

CITIZENS UNITED, PERSONHOOD, AND THE POLITICAL
PERSON OF THE FuTURE

Citizens United has expanded the category of persons for
purposes of the First Amendment. By implication, this case has
now included within the realm of political personhood the "person"
of the corporation. What are the ramifications of this choice for the
law of politics and for the philosophy of American law? This is a
broad question that will be dealt with for years to come.132
First, Citizens United at its most basic level seems to confirm
the ascendancy of corporate interests as the dominant form of
capital within our society. This will have a number of substantive
ramifications for our Republic. The first of those is that corporate
spending now has the great potential to dominate the elective

130. Id. at 971.
131. Id.
132. This Article is meant to be an effort to articulate a progressive, postmodern jurisprudential view of the theoretical possibilities stemming from the
Citizens United case. I think there are ideas here that deserve further
exposition, including the interrelationship between the mobilization of capital
and the protection of status within tiered personhood, the justifications and
problems of limits on First Amendment speech on artificial persons and their
interrelationship with this theory, and how the notion of tiered personhood as
process may be descriptive of the processes of the Court generally. I intend to
discuss these and related points in future articles.
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process. Professor Dale Rubin explicitly argued that corporations
can now "buy and sell" candidates. 133 Professor andre cummings
has pointed out that given the track record of corporate leaders
prior to the financial crisis of 2008, there is no reason to believe
that in a post-Citizens United world that they would not spend
1
recklessly to the end of effectively hijacking the political process. 34
There are others, like Professor Bradley Smith, who have observed
that Citizens United was really an anti-incumbency decision.
Smith argued that Citizens United provides an opportunity for
either political party to receive support, and thus would frustrate
only the interests of incumbents. 35
As a possible progressive reply to Professor Smith, Professor
Stefan Padfield commented that corporate interests have already
purchased candidates through the 2010 election and that the
candidates elected by these corporate interests are supporting
their backers. Professor Padfield commented:
Against this backdrop, what have the newly-elected set out to do?
They have set their sights on abolishing Dodd-Frank for the recently
bailed-out Wall Street bankers who have recovered very nicely
indeed to rake in record profits this year while Main Street
continues to deal with unemployment and foreclosures. They have
set their sights on repealing universal health care, a result much
appreciated by the free-spending health-care industry. They plan on
cutting much of the social safety net so they can continue to give tax
breaks to the wealthy. (Moody's recently estimated that the House
Republicans' proposed cuts would cost 700,000 jobs by 2012.) And
they have set their sights on busting the unions that serve so much
6
of Main Street.13
It is an open question as to whether the ascendancy of
corporate interests will be confirmed by future elections, but it
would seem that this question, which raises serious issues about
the integrity of our democratic process, will need to be addressed
for years to come.
133. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 16, at 550 (noting that the Citizen's United
holding allows corporations to "expend unlimited sums" to support or defeat a
political candidate).
134. See andre douglas pond cummings, Procuring "Justice?": Citizens
United, Caperton, and PartisanJudicialElections, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 89,
108 (2010) (stating "[i]t is to this group of leaders, with proven reckless and
negligent leadership records, that the Supreme Court through Citizens United
confers unfettered ability to spend shareholder funds in campaigning for
preferred politicians and judges.").
135. Bradley Smith, The Incumbent's Bane: Citizens United and the 2010
Election, WALL. ST. J., Jan. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article /SB10001
424052748703 555804576101622398145818.html.
136. Stefan Padfield, The Impact of Citizens United: Anti-Incumbent or ProBusiness, BUS. LAW PROF BLOG, (Mar. 5, 2011), http://lawprofessors.type
pad.com/businesslaw/2011/03/the-impact-of-citizens-united-anti-incumbentor-pro-business.html.
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A second ramification that should be seriously considered and
which was abandoned in Citizens United is the anti-distortion
rationale of Austin.137 It follows from this rationale that direct
corporate spending in elections at all, and especially at a level
above and beyond what an individual could spend would,
arguably, create a perception that the electoral system and
ultimately the government itself are corrupt because they are
beholden to corporate interests. It has been argued that the
abandonment of the anti-distortion rational should be
reconsidered. 38
To add to this concern, there exists the fear that corporate
political personhood, which is now protected within terms of the
speech rights of the First Amendment, can grow into an
unpredictable trump on the political process. To be clear, this
process was designed by citizens to be run for citizens. But now it
may end up being dominated by artificial persons, corporations
whose only interest in political outcomes stems from how those
outcomes may maximize profit, a desire unrelated to that which
Americans actually want. The anti-distortion rationale protects
individuals from distorted communications during elections; it also
creates a semblance of independence for political candidates. If
both of these are lost, the voters may lose the faith in the political
system, what of it there is that remains. Elections may become, in
the words of Alexander Keyssar, "a pro forma ritual designed to
ratify the selection of candidates who have already won the fundraising contests."139 In a post-Citizens United world, these
contests-and perhaps the candidates themselves-will be brought
to the people by corporations.
Third, the ramifications of the process of political
personhood ought to raise concern for us about who the privileged
classes are in our society and how that privilege currently
manifests. It can be argued that the potential exists to shift
control of the American democratic process absolutely from
individuals to corporations. The political, economic, and social
concerns of individuals may then be ignored because corporate
concerns will rate as more important. The more important political
person after Citizens United-indeed, the now-privileged class-is
apparently the corporation and the people who control it.
As Dred Scott empowered slaveholders, and Plessy privileged
the separate white society over African American society, perhaps
the ramification of the Court's latest personhood analysis is the
privileging of corporate power over the traditional political power
137. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (defining anti-distortion
rationale).
138. Hasen, supra note 121, at 990.
139. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY
OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 322 (2000).
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curried by parties and individuals. As evident in those periods, a
stratification of political personhood existed between landed white
men on the one hand, and women and people of color on the other;
perhaps Citizens United now confirms that the corporate person
possesses a greater political personhood status than the individual
person.
Perhaps a third era of tiered personhood has manifested
where corporate interests are superior to individual interests,
which is ironic given that the Constitution and its amendments
were designed to protect the natural person. The Founders
undoubtedly believed in this protection, and perhaps this explains
the outcry from the general public regarding Citizens United.
Intuitively, this tiered personhood does not fit the reality of what
people think of when they think of a "right." The ramifications of
this turn-if it holds out to be true-will irrevocably change
society in the twenty-first century.
Finally, and beyond mere analytical analogy to the
personhood cases, maybe this story is, once again, explicitly about
race, gender and class stratification. In the immediate aftermath
of Citizens United, Steven Ramirez on the Corporate Justice Blog
noted the following:
[T]here has been one female of color who has ever served as the
CEO of a Fortune 500 company-and that happened only last
summer [2009]. That appears to bring the total number of African
American CEOs to five. As of November, 2007, there were four
Latino CEOs and fourteen women.
With respect to board seats, men hold 83% of all Fortune 100
directorships. Latinos and African Americans hold 14% of such
positions and Asian Americans hold 1%. For Fortune 500 companies
the reality is bleaker-there are even fewer African American
directors and the number is declining. Only 3% of all Fortune 500
board positions are held by Hispanics.
To the extent that Citizens United shifts political power to
corporations, fundamentally, it shifts power away from communities
of color (and women) notwithstanding their increased voting
power.140
This shift in power to the corporate form appears to raise the
question of legitimizing not only corporate form as the dominant
form of capital but also affirming a new form of political power
that will control the traditional political hierarchies. The blunt
140. Steven Ramirez, The Corporatocaracyand Race and Gender: Inverse
Convergence Theory, CORPORATE JUSTICE BLOG, (Jan. 31, 2010),

http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/corporatocracy-and-race-andgender.html; see also cummings, supra note 137, at 109 (citing Ramirez to
demonstrate that although women and communities of color have experienced
increased voting power, white males dominate the voting power in
corporations).
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fact is that those who control these hierarchies are mostly white
and mostly male. Further, this group is a substantial minority in
American society, given that those who run corporations and own
corporations are small in number in relation to the rest of diverse
America. What we face is the possibility of a few who could
represent a stratified, homogeneous class in America that holds
the power to dominate elections and to tilt the democratic process
in its favor. Put another way, the question to be asked is whether
Citizens United marks the beginning of an era where this country
makes plain the existence of tiered political personhood, where the
individual citizens' interests are sublimated to the interests of
corporate artificial persons (and the minority of upper-class,
mostly white male persons who own the corporations).
This appears to be a consequence of the Court's granting
political personhood to corporations. This choice-like that in Dred
Scott and Plessy-may alter our society for years to come,
especially given that by 2050 ethnic minorities may become the
majority in this country. By 2050, political, economic, and social
power may be concentrated in the hands of a minority of mostly
white, mostly male powerbrokers who may effectively be an
oligarchy in relation to the majority-minority population of the
United States. Such a scenario certainly warrants concern.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Corporate speech is only one piece of a larger puzzle that has
to do with race, class, the distribution of wealth, and the
manifestations of privilege in American society. But in this era of
unfettered political speech by corporations, if we are not critical of
the policies of democracy going forward, and if we do not look at
the possibility of corporate dominance of the electoral system with
a cynical and proactive eye, the generations that follow us may
count Citizens United-alongwith Dred Scott, Minor, and Plessyas one of the most infamous decisions, adverse to individual rights,
ever rendered by the Supreme Court.

